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I. Introduction  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is an amendment to a federal statute 
created to shield specific computers that would be vulnerable to attacks. Since its origin, the code 
has grown and expanded far beyond its original scope. Courts are split on how the statute should 
be interpreted when there are issues of impersonation on social media and terms of service 
violations of websites. This report will discuss the legislative history and the intended use of the 
statute. Followed by how the statute has grown since its inception, this report will further discuss 
the future of the CFAA.  
II. The Birth and Growth of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act  
The Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (“CFAA”) is a heavily contested amendment to the 
federal code 18 U.S.C. §10301. Courts across the country are split on how and when the section 
should be applied. When the CFAA was passed in 1984 its application appeared 
straightforward2. As time passed and the Internet grew, the CFAA has been stretched by courts 
to cover many aspects of Internet governance, in some places, where it may not have been 
intended to apply. Since the CFAA’s initial inception, the statute grew and in some courts has 
become a catchall for all computer crimes.  
At its earliest inception, the proposed amendment was very specific. The initial is found 
in the “Health and Environment Miscellaneous” bill from the committee on Energy and 
Commerce in 19833.  The primary form of the statute was part of a medical reform bill, “Medical 
Computer Crime Act of 1984,” to make unauthorized access to medical records “through a 
                                                 
1  18 U.S.C. §1030 
2  Id. 
3  Health and the Environment Miscellaneous, Part 4, 85 CIS H 36119 (1983) 
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telecommunication device…” a crime4.  Not only was this specified to medical records, it was 
specific to unauthorized access or alteration of computerized medical records5 
Congress held hearings to establish a computer crime statute in the early 1980’s. The 
Judiciary Committee held hearings considering establishing criminal penalties for the Counterfeit 
Access Device and Computer Fraud Act of 19836. The act expanded to protected computers 
owned or used by the federal government, financial institutions, and/or businesses engaged in 
interstate commerce7. The amendment originally stipulated to medical records now included 
much more under its large umbrella.  
As CFAA was being discussed in various hearings, the potential abuse of computers 
became more evident. The act was expanded to include criminal penalties for computers 
“involving unauthorized access to financial information, and unauthorized access to Government 
information, including classified information related to foreign relations or national defense.” 
The ever-growing amendment became a tool for national security and criminalized accessing 
government information.8 
By the time the bill’s senate floor debate was finished, it included: “unauthorized access 
to or alteration of information in Federal interest computers.”9 Federal interest computers were 
defined as “computers used by or for the Federal Government, those of federally insured 
financial institutions, those of stockbrokers registered with the SEC, or those used in different 
States…[i]ncludes provisions on illegal access to computerized individual medical record.”10 
                                                 
4  Id. 
5  Id. 
6  Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 85 CIS H 52139 (1983) 
7  Id. 
8  H. Rpt. 98-894 at p.28 (1984) 
9  99 CIS Legis. Hist. P.L. 474 (1986) 
10  Id. 
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Moreover, the act made it a crime to engage in the sale of passwords or similar 
information that would allow unauthorized computer access.11 Congress intended the amendment  
provide a well-defined assertion of prohibited activity to “the law enforcement community, those 
who own and operate computers, as well as those who may be tempted to commit crimes by 
unauthorized access.”12 Essentially, Congress intended those who would be affected by the law 
to have clearly defined parameters as to what actions would constitute a crime or lead to civil 
penalties.  
To further ensure the act was correctly applied, the legislature changed “knowingly” to 
“intentionally” in 1986, heightening the required mens rea.13The statute’s intent was to penalize 
intentional unauthorized access and not careless ones.14 Although there was some concern that 
the knowing standard was difficult to apply to technology.15 "’Intentional' means more than that 
one voluntarily engaged in conduct or caused a result. Such conduct or the causing of the result 
must have been the person's conscious objective."16 The user had to intend to go beyond his or 
her authorization. More than just knowing he did, the user had to intend for that to be his 
purpose.  
Finally, the CFAA was officially codified in 1986, amending 18 USC §1030 of the US 
Codes 17. The language includes: “intentionally accesses a Federal interest computer without 
authorization… alters, damages, or destroys information causes a loss…aggregating $1,000 or 
more during any one year period…or modifies or impairs the medical examination, medical 
                                                 
11  Id. 
12  Id. 
13  Senate Report No. 99-432 at 5-6 
14  Id. 
15  Id. 
16  Id. 
17  Congressional Record, Vol. 132 (1986) 
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diagnosis, medical treatment, or medical care…”18  It included the unauthorized access of 
medical records for a specific purpose.19  
A “federal interest computer was defined as “exclusively for the use of a financial 
institution or the United States Government, or…used by or for a financial institution or the 
United States Government and the conduct constituting the offense affects the use of the 
financial institution's operation or the Government's operation of such computer…”20 The act 
includes two or more computers, used in committing the offense, that were not located in the 
same state.21 
After the act was codified, there were several changes to the definitions and the scope of 
the statute.  These changes were based on experience, technology, and world events. After 9/11, 
Congress pushed through numerous national security reforms including cyber security and the 
United and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and 
Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT).22  The USA PATRIOT Act amended the definition of 
“protected computer” to clarify the term includes computers outside of the United States so long 
as they affect “interstate or foreign commerce or communication of the United States.”23  
Experience with the statute brought about expansions and revisions as computer crimes 
escalated and the government began to work with the CFAA.24 Congress made revisions to the 
amendment, which eliminated some requirements and expanded the act’s reach in 1988, 1989, 
                                                 
18  Id.  
19  Id.  
20  Id.  
21  Id.  
22 CRS Report for Congress: The Internet and the USA PATRIOT Act: Potential Implications for Electronic 
Privacy, Security, Commerce, and Government 3/4/2002   
23  18 U.S.C. §1030(e)(2)(B) (2001). 
24  Prosecuting Computer Crimes: Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section Criminal Division 
Federal Prosecutor’s at p. 2 
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1990, 1994, 1996, 2001, 2002, and 2008.25 The amendments eliminated 18 U.S.C. 
§1030(a)(2)(C) which required information be stolen through interstate or foreign 
communication and 18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(5) which required a loss of more than $5,000 and 
created a felony when the damage affected 10 or more computers.26 Eliminating those 
requirements increased the CFAA’s scope. 
Further changes included expanding 18 USC §1030(a)(7) to criminalize threats to cause 
computer damage and included threats to (1) steal data on a computer, (2) publicly disclose 
stolen data, or (3) not repair damage already caused to the computer.27 The amendments 
criminalized conspiracy to commit computer hacking, and again, broadened the definition of a 
protected computer in 18 U.S.C. § 1030(e)(2) to include those computers used in interstate or 
foreign commerce or communication.28 
The current CFAA applies to all “protected computers.”  A protected computer is any 
computer used in interstate commerce or communication and applies to Internet Service 
Providers and individual computers.29 The CFAA creates seven crimes, including criminal 
penalties, when a user “intentionally accesses” without authorized access or exceeding their 
authorized access and attains information from a protected computer30. Furthermore, the statute 
definition of “damage” is a vague term that can mean anything that impairs the data of a 
program, system, or information.31 
CFAA set forth criminal penalties and criminalized unauthorized access to a computer 
“knowingly with intent to defraud” and retrieving any information that may be valuable, unless 
                                                 
25  Id. 
26  Id. 
27  Id. 
28  Id. 
29  Information Privacy Law Solove and Schwartz, 5d 907 (2015)  
30  18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(2)(c) 
31  Id. 
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the object of the fraud consists only of the use of the computer and is less than $5,000 in a one 
year period.32 Punishment for such crimes can be as minimal as fines ranging to a maximum of 
twenty years imprisonment depending on what part of the statute is violated.33 
The statute also provides civil liabilities, “Any person who suffers damage or loss by 
reason of a violation of this section may maintain a civil action against the violator to obtain 
compensatory damages and injunctive relief or other equitable relief.”34 If the section is violated, 
“A civil action for a violation… may be brought only if the conduct involves 1 of the factors set 
forth in subclauses… subsection (c)(4)(A)(i).”35 The statute limits damages to economic 
damages and sets the statute of limitations within two years of the date of the alleged act or 
discovery of the damage.36 
III. Interpretations that Expand the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Courts across the nation have used the CFAA to prosecute and hold defendants civilly 
liable for damages when a person exceeds the authority of accessing an email account, or 
utilizing someone else’s social media profile as their own. These courts have various reasons that 
impersonating someone on social media sites and through their e-mail violates the CFAA.  
The District Court of Massachusetts held that accessing another’s social media account, 
without his permission, created liability under the CFAA in Mahoney v. Denuzzio, 2014 U.S. 
Dist. (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2014).37 In Mahoney, James Mahoney and Danielle Denuzzio were once 
romantically involved and had a child together.   Their relationship disintegrated and tensions 
rose regarding child custody.38  Mahoney had visited Denuzzio’s home and accessed his own 
                                                 
32  18 U.S.C. §1030(a)(4) 
33  Information Privacy Law Solove and Schwartz, 5d 907 (2015) 
34  18 U.S.C. §1030(g) 
35  Id. 
36  Id. 
37  Mahoney v. Denuzzio, 2014 U.S. Dist. (D. Mass. Jan. 29, 2014) 
38  Id. at 2.  
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personal Yahoo! e-mail and Facebook accounts using her computer.39 DeNuzzio had disclosed 
two pages of racist emails to the Probate Court that were from Mahoney’s Yahoo! Account.”40 
DeNuzzio had intended to use the emails to show Mahoney was a racist and therefore, it would 
not have been in the child’s best interest to be in his custody.41 
Mahoney alleged that DeNuzzio composed the emails and the court order was the first 
notice he received that she obtained access to his accounts. He contends that he did not give her 
passwords to either his email or Facebook account.42 Mahoney hired a computer forensics expert 
that concluded “on 502 occasions from January 1 through June 27, 2011, someone using the 
computer DeNuzzio regularly used had obtained access to Mahoney's Yahoo! e-mail account.”43 
Mahoney suspected that Denuzzio obtained his password by using software that recorded his 
keystrokes and sought to file a criminal complaint but criminal charges were never pursued.44  
The civil court found that the complaint plausibly stated grounds for relief.45  The 
computer was involved in interstate commerce, and according to the court, all computers 
connected to the Internet are considered “protected.”46 DeNuzzio did not have the authority to 
access Mahoney’s e-mail or social media accounts.47 The plaintiff’s monetary loss was 
reasonable in response to “…an offense, conducting a damage assessment, and restoring . . . the 
system . . . to its condition prior to the offense, and any revenue lost, cost incurred, or other 
consequential damages incurred because of interruption of service.”48 Mahoney’s costs include 
                                                 
39  Id. 
40  Id. at 4 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. at 5 
45  Id. at 11 
46  Id. at 12 
47  Id.  
48  18 U.S.C.S. §1030 
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hiring a computer forensics firm and hiring an attorney to remedy the breach in the probate 
court.49 
The court held that the motion could survive a motion to dismiss, but no further action 
was taken at the time of this report. Consequently, the facts of the case fall directly under 
CFAA’s civil liabilities allowed.50 Mahoney’s monetary damages were directly related to 
DeNuzzio’s unauthorized use of his e-mail account because the damages included investigation 
and attorney’s fees for his lawsuit.51 
Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2015) is a case of first impression from the 
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.  The lower court dismissed the complaint as being time 
barred by the two-year statute of limitations.52 Sewell and Bernardin were in a romantic 
relationship until 2011.53   Throughout their relationship, Sewell maintained a private e-mail and 
Facebook account.54 Bernardin did not have the passwords or access to these accounts.55 
In August 2011, Sewell was notified that her AOL password had been changed and the 
unauthorized user sent out malicious emails, regarding her sexual activities, to her family 
members.56 In February of 2012, Sewell was unable to log into her Facebook account and on 
March 1, 2012 someone posted a public message containing malicious statements about 
Sewell.57 
On August 2, 2014, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of New York 
granted Bernardin's motion to dismiss, holding that “Sewell's claims were time-barred under the 
                                                 
49  Denuzzio at 12. 
50  Id. 
51  Id. 
52  Sewell v. Bernardin, 795 F.3d 337 (2d Cir. 2015) 
53  Id. 
54 Id. at 339  
55 Id.   
56  Id.  
57  Id.  
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CFAA's and SCA's applicable two-year statutes of limitations.”58 Sewell then appealed and on 
appeal the lower court’s decision to dismiss was affirmed.59 The AOL account breach was time 
barred by the statute.60  
On appeal, the circuit court concluded that there were two separate CFAA claims: 1) 
from the AOL account when she had notice in August 2011 and from the defendant accessing 
her Facebook account in February of 2012.61 The court held that the CFAA claim “is premised 
on impairment to the integrity of a computer owned and operated by AOL, not of her own 
physical computer.”62 CFAA claims are for the programs that were utilized by the user and 
trespasser and not just the trespass of the physical computer, itself.63The court held that there 
were two valid claims under the CFAA and that one, regarding unauthorized use of her Facebook 
account, was not time barred under the statute.64 There were no further court proceedings at the 
time. Here, the court sought to clarify the a CFAA claim does not focus on the victim’s personal 
computer but of the computers of the programs that are accessed.  
The most recent case litigated under CFAA is Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 
2016 U.S. App. 12781 (9th Cir.). Power Ventures, the defendant, created a social networking 
website that operated by aggregating a user’s previously existing social networking accounts and 
information.65 The “Power user” could see all their contacts from multiple social networking 
sites through a single program and could click through the central Power website to individual 
social networking sites.66 
                                                 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
60  Id. at 340 
61  Id. 
62  Id. at 341 
63  Id. 
64  Id. 
65  Facebook, Inc. v. Power Ventures, Inc., 828 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 2016)  
66  Id. at 1071 
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At the time of Power’s promotional campaign, Facebook.com, the plaintiff, had 130 
million users and allowed limited access to non-members.67 Third party software developers, or 
websites that want to contact Facebook users through its website, must enroll in “Facebook 
Connect,” a program that requires a user to agree to an additional Developer Terms of Use 
Agreement.68 
In December 2008, Power began a promotional campaign where they placed an icon on 
their website to entice users to share Power.com by stating, “First 100 people who bring 100 new 
friends to Power.com win $100.”69 Once a user clicked “Yes, I do!” Power would create an 
event, photo, or status on the Facebook user’s profile.70 Depending on a Facebook user’s 
settings, Power would send a message or e-mail to the user’s friends within Facebook’s system.71  
For example, if a Power user shared the promotion through an event, Facebook generated 
e-mail to an external e-mail account from the user to their friends.72 The e-mail provided the 
name and time of the event, listing Power as the host, and said the Power user was inviting them 
to the event.73 “The external e-mails were form e-mails, generated each time that a Facebook 
user invited others to an event. The ‘from’ line in the e-mail stated that the message came from 
Facebook; the body was signed, ‘The Facebook Team.’”74 
Facebook was unaware of Power’s promotional campaign until December 2008, and 
when they did they sent a “cease and desist” letter to Power.75 Facebook attempted to have 
                                                 
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. 
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
73  Id. 
74  Id. 
75  Id. 
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Power register in Facebook Connect and sign the special Developer Terms of Use Agreement.76 
When they refused Facebook established an Internet Protocol (“IP”) block to prevent them from 
accessing Facebook’s website.77 Power switched IP addresses to avoid the block and continued 
its promotion even though it utilized Facebook.com without Facebook’s permission.78 In total, 
over the course of Power’s campaign, they sent more than 60,000 external emails using 
Facebook’s system, and countless internal messages.79 By April 2011, Power had gone out of 
business.80  
Facebook argued violations under the CFAA, which prohibits acts of computer trespass 
by those unauthorized users or users who exceed their authorization.81 The court held that 
Facebook suffered a loss and was entitled to civil penalties because Facebook employees “spent 
many hours, totaling more than $5,000 in costs, analyzing, investigating, and responding to 
Power's actions”82.  
The court concluded that Power accessed Facebook’s computers knowing they did not 
have authorization.83 The court based its analysis on two previous cases: United States v. Nosal, 
676 F.3d 854 (9th Cir. 2012) also known as “Nosal I” and United States v. Nosal, No. 14-10037, 
2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 12382, (9th Cir. July 5,2016) known as "Nosal II".84 There are two 
general rules the court needs to follow using Nosal’s analysis: first, a defendant can violate the 
CFAA when he lacks permission to access a computer or when his permission has been 
                                                 
76  Id. 
77  Id. at 1074 
78  Id. 
79  Id. 
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 1078 
82  Id. 
83  Id.at 1082 
84  Id. at 1085 
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explicitly revoked.85 Using better technology or a third party to help access a site does not excuse 
the violating user of liability.86 Second, violating the terms of use for a website, alone, cannot be 
a basis for liability.87  
IV. Interpretations that Narrow the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
In some courts, the interpretation has been broadened beyond what the original intent 
may have been. On the other hand, there are a number of courts that construe the terms narrowly. 
In doing so, the vague statute is being tapered to apply in a smaller number of circumstances.  
United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009) is a well-known case involving 
the CFAA. The issue in the case was whether a violation of the “Terms of Service” (“TOS”) for 
a website constitutes a crime under the CFAA.88 Drew, a resident of Missouri, entered a 
conspiracy to intentionally access a computer used in interstate commerce, without authorization, 
in order to commit a tortious act (infliction of emotional distress) on Megan Meier, a thirteen 
year old girl.89 Drew, and conspirators, impersonated 16-year-old boy named “Josh” they began 
a romantic relationship via MySpace until the conspirators told Megan he did not like her and 
“the world would be a better place without her in it.”90 Megan killed herself later that day. 
Their actions violated the MySpace Terms of Service (“TOS”)91 Drew was indicted for 
one count of conspiracy and three counts of violating the felony portion of the CFAA “which 
prohibit accessing a computer without authorization or in excess of authorization and obtaining 
information from a protected computer where the conduct involves an interstate or foreign 
                                                 
85  Id. 
86  Id. 
87  Id. 
88  United States v. Drew, 259 F.R.D. 449 (C.D. Cal. 2009)  
89  Id. 
90  Id. 
91  Id. 
 14 
communication and the offense is committed in furtherance of a crime or tortious act.”92 
The court went through an analysis of the Myspace TOS. In 2006, to be a Myspace 
member, a person had to access the sign up section for the Myspace website and register by 
filling out information meeting specific age requirements.93 The information required included: 
name, e-mail, and date of birth, country, zip, code, and gender.94 The registrant had to click the 
“I agree” box for Myspace’s TOS and Privacy Policy.95 The Terms of Service did not appear on 
the same page, and to read them the user had to scroll to the bottom to click on the “Terms” 
hyperlink.96 Unsurprisingly, a person could easily become a member of the Myspace community 
without ever reading the TOS section.97 
The TOS prohibited posting content that could be offensive and “promotes…harasses or 
advocates harassment of another person…promotes illegal activity… or promotes illegal 
activities or conduct that is abusive, threatening…includes a photograph of another 
person…without their consent…”98 The Myspace TOS reserved the right to take legal action 
against anyone who engaged in the prohibited activity which included “a) ‘criminal or tortious 
activity’, b) ‘attempting to impersonate another Member or person’, c) ‘using any information 
obtained from the Services in order to harass, abuse, or harm  another person’, d) ‘using the 
Service in a manner inconsistent with any and all applicable laws and regulations’… “99 
The TOS warned other users that other Myspace members may have false or misleading 
information on their profiles, and further indicated that Myspace will not be held liable.100 
                                                 
92  Id. at 451 
93 Id. 
94  Id. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. 
97  Id. 
98  Id. at 454 
99  Id. 
100  Id. 
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Moreover, Myspace reserved the right to change their TOS at any time, which meant a member 
would have to check the TOS every time they logged on to ensure they were not violating the 
terms.101 
The relevant issue was whether a computer user’s intentional violation of a websites 
terms of services satisfies the first element of U.S.C. § 1030(a)(2)(C): defendant intentionally 
accessed without authorization of a computer.102 If the answer was yes, then any conscious 
violation will constitute a CFAA misdemeanor.103 The following elements are always met when 
a person utilizing a computer contacts or communicates with a website.104  Accessing 
information can be as minimal as observation of the data.105 Targeting the data for collection or 
corruption is not needed to prove a violation.106 
The district court analyzed the first element, intentionally accessed without authorization 
of a computer, focusing on three undefined terms.107 “Intentionally’ is undefined, the court uses 
the legislative history of the CFAA. The court interpreted Congress’s actions of raising the 
scienter from knowing to intent to show a heightened mens rea.108 The legislator intended for a 
defendant to mean to cross an unauthorized threshold and not just know they crossed it. The 
court uses the dictionary definition of “access” “to gain or have access to; to retrieve…”109 The 
third undefined and necessary term, “without authorization” is a term that will change depending 
on the nature of the circumstances, according to the court.110  
                                                 
101  Id. 
102  Id. 
103  Id. 
104  Id. 
105  Id. 
106  Id. at 458 
107  Id. 
108  Id. 
109  Id. at 459.  
110  Id. 
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Applying this to the facts of the case, the only factual basis to conclude Drew 
intentionally accessed Myspace’s servers without authorization was her violating Myspace’s 
TOS by deliberately creating the fake “Josh Evans” profile using a photo of a juvenile without 
permission just to communicate with Meagan.111 The court concludes that an intentional breach 
of the MSTOS can potentially constitute accessing the Myspace server without authorization 
under the statute.112  
The owner of a website has the right to institute the boundaries of information their 
members can access or applications available on their website.113 As a right of law, an owner can 
relay and impose “limitations/restrictions/conditions” by a written notice like the terms of service 
or use provisions on a homepage.114 Most courts that have reviewed TOS cases have held that a 
website’s TOS can define what is authorized regarding a website.115 
The court concluded that basing a CFAA misdemeanor upon the violation of a websites 
TOS would contravene the void-for-vagueness doctrine.116 When it comes to “clickwrap” 
agreements, like the Myspace TOS, the issue is whether a person of “common intelligence” 
would be on notice that a breach of the terms would create a CFAA violation.117 First, the statute 
itself does not put people on notice, they may be aware of civil penalties but not criminal 
charges.118  
Second, the TOS does not specify which breached term leads to termination of authorized 
                                                 
111  Id. at 460 
112  Id. 
113  Id. at 462 
114  Id. 
115  Id. 
116  Id. at 464 
117  Id. 
118  Id. 
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access for the user.119 The court concluded that “if any violation of any term of service is held to 
make the access unauthorized, that strategy would probably resolve this particular vagueness 
issue; but …render the statute incredibly overbroad and contravene the second prong of the void-
for-vagueness doctrine as to setting guidelines to govern law enforcement.”120  
Third, by utilizing the TOS as the basis for a crime, it makes the website owner the party 
who defines criminal conduct.121 It is possible that the description in the TOS is so vague that a 
reasonable person might be unsure of what the TOS covers.122Fourth, because the TOS are a 
contractual way to set the scope of authorized access “a level of indefiniteness arises from the 
necessary application of contract law in general and/or other contractual requirements within the 
applicable terms of service to any criminal prosecution.”123  
The court concluded that treating a website’s TOS violation as an 18 U.S.C. 
§1030(a)(2)(C), would turn the section “into an overwhelmingly overbroad enactment that would 
convert a multitude of otherwise innocent Internet users into misdemeanant criminals.”124 
Concluding any other way would create a law that "that affords too much discretion to the police 
and too little notice to citizens who wish to use the [Internet]."125  
Tan v. Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61972 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014), narrowed the 
definition of a “protected computer” and what it means to “damage” a computer. This case was 
litigated under the CFAA private right of action.126 Tan involved two business partners whose 
partnership ended antagonistically.127 The plaintiffs were a married couple, Miah, co-founded a 
                                                 
119  Id. 
120  Id. 
121  Id. 
122  Id. at 465 
123  Id. 
124  Id. at 465-466 
125  Id. at 466 
126  Tan v. Doe, 2014 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 61972 (S.D.N.Y. May 1, 2014) at 1 
127  Id. 
 18 
digital music company called UrFilez.128 There was a dispute between Miah and the co-founder 
and in August 2012, the plaintiffs claim that derogatory posts appeared on several blogs, 
including their wedding photo.129 The posts accused the couple of fraudulent and unethical 
misconduct, which included siphoning money from UrFilez.130 
 The plaintiffs allege that the blogs have spread to social media sites and have resulted in 
irreparable damage to their personal and professional reputations.131 Their complaint against 
“John Doe” included an application to subpoena non-party websites including Twitter and 
Facebook to help them identify who “John Doe” was and a temporary restraining order 
“directing these companies to remove the derogatory statements from their website.”132  
The plaintiffs’ complaint asserts copyright infringement, defamation, tortious 
interference, false light, and a violation of the CFAA.133 The court analyzed the plaintiff’s CFAA 
claim, and found they failed to state a claim for three reasons:134 The court found the complaint 
failed to allege a “protected computer let alone a “computer” that was accessed or damaged as a 
result of alleged conduct.135 
CFAA defines a protected computer to include a "computer…used in interstate or foreign 
commerce or communication."136 To satisfy this, the court held the facts must evince a plausible 
inference of a substantial use of the computer related to interstate commerce.137 The fact a 
computer is connected to the Internet and able to be used in interstate commerce is not enough to 
                                                 
128  Id. 
129  Id. 
130  Id. 
131  Id. 
132  Id. 
133  Id. 
134  Id. at 2 
135  Id. 
136  18 U.S.C. 1030(e)(2)(B) 
137  Id. 
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be considered actually used in interstate commerce.138 
Consequently, if the court assumed that the defendant’s utilizing Facebook to retrieve 
their wedding photo was unauthorized access of a protected computer, their CFAA clam still 
fails.139 The CFAA claim does not allege the access resulted in any damage to the computer.140 
Downloading and circulating the wedding photo, even if it were confidential information, does 
no destruction or impairment to the “underlying data.”141 Plaintiffs did not allege their photo was 
destroyed or impaired.142  
The Tan Court’s analysis is completely different than the court in Drew which held the 
elements are always met when a person communicates with a website and even observing the 
data is enough to prove a violation.143 The court based the interpretation in senate reports.144  
Finally, the plaintiff’s financial damages are not the types that were considered under the 
CFAA.145 They allege that the aggregate losses resulting from the defendant’s conduct was more 
than $10,000, the damages are not discernable under the statute.146 CFAA “’loss …is limited to 
the ‘cost of investigating or remedying damage to a computer, or cost incurred because the 
computer's service was interrupted…”147 The loss plaintiffs alleged pertained to their business 
reputation which is not what the CFAA designates as a loss.  
However, in 2015, another CFAA interpretation came to light which further narrowed its 
scope.  Bittman v. Fox, 107 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2015) interprets the CFAA to exclude 
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cases of social media impersonation, even if there were financial damages.148 Plaintiff Bridget 
Bittman is a marketing and public relations employee at the Orland Park Public Library.149 In the 
fall of 2013, Fox and DuJan complained that the library was providing unfiltered access to the 
Internet and lobbied the library to change their policies.150 Bittman, in charge of public relations, 
responded to the defendant’s complaints.151 
Subsequently, Bittman, Fox, and DuJan began a special media war with Fox and DuJan 
making defamatory statements about Bittman.152 Fox posted comments about Bittman on her 
Facebook page, accusing Bittman and the public library of presenting a “hatefest” and making 
false police complaints against Fox and DuJan.153  
Fox posted a photo of Bittman holding a champagne bottle and accused her of “being 
drunk to claim the ridiculous things she does about the library in the media…”154 Fox then 
posted photos of Bittman’s home on the Internet, which Bittman alleged was an attempt to harass 
her.155 Fox published a video titled “Bridget Bittman commits Disorderly Conduct/Breach of 
Peace on 7/8/14 according to Officer Schmidt" and several captions of defamatory statements. 156  
Furthermore, Fox and DuJan created a Facebook page, “Sassy Plants Illinois” 
impersonating Bittman and her floral business.157 They utilized her personal photos and photos 
of her floral arrangements without her authorization and posted statements to convince people 
that Bittman, in reality, controlled the page.158 The statements included derogatory references 
                                                 
148  Bittman v. Fox, 107 F. Supp. 3d 896 (N.D. Ill. 2015) 
149  Id at 898. 
150  Id. 
151  Id. 
152  Id. 
153  Id. 
154  Id. 
155  Id. 
156  Id. 
157  Id. 
158  Id. 
 21 
imply that Bittman was prejudiced.159 Finally, in January 2015, Bittman filed a thirteen-count 
complaint including one count under the CFAA.160 
The CFAA prohibits unauthorized users from intentionally accessing secure computers 
and damaging the computer or data.161 Bittman argues Fox and DuJan are liable for creating the 
Sassy Plants Facebook Page, violating Facebook’s terms of use.162 By creating the page, using 
photographs of herself and her floral arrangements, Fox and DuJan violated the terms of use and 
exceeded their authorized access to Facebook’s computers.163  
The court concluded that Bittman presented no evidence which suggested the CFAA 
provided a cause of action for the alleged transgression.164 The court held, “the statutory purpose 
of the CFAA is to punish trespassers and hackers.”165 They looked to the legislative history of 
the act, and surmised that Congress was concerned with hackers attacking using viruses and 
possibly disgruntled computer programmers.166 CFAA was not enacted to punish people who 
create fake social media accounts, violating the website’s terms of service.167 
The court hypothesizes that even if Fox and DuJan violated Facebook’s terms of use by 
creating the fake account to impersonate and defame Bittman, the action does not constitute 
“exceeding authorization” as envisioned in CFAA.168 Fox and DuJan did not damage, steal, or 
tamper with Bittman’s data.169 They had no intention in permanently harming Bittman’s 
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computer data.170 
 
V. The Future of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
Differing interpretations of the CFAA have caused disconnect in the courts regarding 
how and when the CFAA applies to cases involving social media websites and email accounts. 
Some courts interpret “protected” as any computer utilized in interstate commerce.171 While 
others use a stricter definition, requiring the computer be used in interstate commerce, being 
connected to the Internet is not enough to require federal protection.172 Unauthorized access of 
information can be simply accessing information without authorization with no actual objective 
necessary for a violation.173 
The conflicts have become so contentious that the Department of Justice recently 
published a memo, dated September 11, 2014 on their website in October of 2016.174 The memo, 
written by Eric Holder as the Attorney General, stated that the memo was to provide guidance 
for prosecutors.175 The memo provided prosecutors with eight factors. The first, and major 
factor, was to consider whether prosecution would serve a substantial federal interest.176 Though 
ambiguous, the factor would help separate serious hackers and threats to cybersecurity from 
computer users who violate a website’s terms of service.  
Some other factors include: 1) sensitivity of the affected computer system or the 
information transmitted by or stored on it; 2) the national security implications of the crime  
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impact of the crime on victims; 3) the deterrent value of the investigation; 4) whether the crime 
can be prosecuted by another jurisdiction if it is declined for federal prosecution; 5)if information 
is obtained by  exceeding authorized access.177 
Only a minority of states enacted legislation regarding identity theft on social media sites, 
allowing them to prosecute the crime avoiding utilization of the CFAA.178 Texas is an example 
of a state law regarding online impersonation: “a person commits an offense if the person, 
without obtaining the other person's consent and with the intent to harm, defraud, intimidate, or 
threaten any person, uses the name or persona of another person to:(1) create a web page on a 
commercial social networking site or other Internet website…”179 
Due to the ambiguous language and tough punishments for violations there has been an 
outcry for change. An article in Scientific American exemplified a harsh fact: “CFAA allows 
prosecutors to pursue the same draconian measures—punishments ranging from five to 15 years 
per charge—for acts as benign as violating the terms of a vendor’s service agreements and those 
as malicious as a concerted effort to break into a computer and steal credit card numbers.”180  
 Congress has considered amending the CFAA to clarify “access without 
authorization.”181 “Aaron’s Law Act of 2015” is an attempt by lawmakers to reform the CFAA 
which is an “overly broad law currently allows breathtaking levels of prosecutorial 
discretion…”182 The main objective of Aaron’s Law’s is to retain the parts of the CFAA that 
work while eliminating the portions prone to abuse.183  
                                                 
177  Id. 
178  COMMENT: Identity Theft on Social Networking Sites: Developing Issues of Internet Impersonation, 29 
Touro L. Rev. 455 
179  Tex. Penal Code § 33.07 (LexisNexis, Lexis Advance through the 2015 regular session, 84th Legislature)  
180  It’s Time to Reform the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN, 
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/its-times-reform-computer-fraud-abuse-act/ (last visited Nov. 30, 2016). 
181  Statements on Introduced Bills and Joint Resolutions, 161 Cong Rec S 2302 
182  Id. at 2303 
183  Id. 
 24 
 One of the proposed changes includes replacing the term “exceeds authorized access” 
with “access without authorization means (A) to obtain information on a protected computer; (B) 
that the accesser lacks authorization to obtain; and (C) by knowingly circumventing one or more 
technological or physical measures that are designed to exclude or prevent unauthorized 
individuals from obtaining that information;’’184 Such a change would create a more concrete 
definition for a critical term used in the statute.  
 Furthermore, the proposed amendment would make criminal penalties proportional to the 
crime committed under the act.185” By striking ‘conviction for another’' and inserting 
‘subsequent’; and (B) by inserting ‘such’ after ‘attempt to commit’’; by inserting after ‘financial 
gain’ the following: ‘and the fair market value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000…’”186 
The offense would be committed “…furtherance of any criminal act in violation of the 
Constitution or laws of the United States or of any State punishable by a term of imprisonment 
greater than one year, unless such criminal acts are prohibited by this section or such State 
violation would be based solely on accessing information without authorization…''187  
 The proposed changes would tailor the CFAA back to its original legislative intent: an 
anti-hacking law. There would be less room for courts to apply the law in cases of social media 
impersonation and other situations where it did not belong. An amendment would protect the 
CFAA from abuse and overreach. State legislatures have the power to create such laws and only 
a minority of state legislated such statutes. The alteration of the sentencing section would 
enhance the sentencing portion by eliminating the problem of minor offenses being punishable 
the same as more severe violations.  
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 On the other hand, there is an argument for more power under the statute.188 Some 
lawmakers believe that in the age of cyber-attacks and technological warfare, the CFAA should 
be much stronger. In 2011, President Obama issued the Cyber Security Legislative Proposal 
urging Congress to give the government, and the private sector, more powerful tools and harsher 
punishments.189 Part of the plan includes an increase in penalties and expansion of the 
government’s power for enforcement of the CFAA.190 Instead of the minimum penalty being 
merely a misdemeanor, the least offensive violation would still be considered a felony, with a 
ten-year maximum.191 At a Congressional hearing witnesses, including FBI agents, stated 
hacktivists were among their adversaries.192 Their reforms would give the government more 
power but go after serious threats to national security.  
To better prosecute these crimes law enforcement would require the appropriate tools to 
investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. It also reaffirms important components of 2011 proposals 
to update the Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, applying it to 
cybercrimes. 193Finally, the proposal modernizes the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act by ensuring 
that insignificant conduct does not fall within the scope of the statute, while making clear that it 
can be used to prosecute insiders who abuse their ability to access information to use it for their 
own purposes.  
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 Moreover, “exceeds authorized access” includes “… when he accesses information ‘for a 
purpose that the accesser knows is not authorized by the computer owner.’”194 In some cases, the 
language would prohibit breaching a written condition, like a Terms of Service written by a 
website.195 The addition would create havoc in the courts as to what the computer owner would 
and would not allow when it is not a written condition. It gives prosecutors across the country a 
large amount of discretion as to what the unauthorized user was on notice about as to what they 
had the authority to access.  
 The proposed legislation would add a provision that would punish a user who 
“intentionally exceeds authorized access to a protected computer, and thereby obtains 
information from such computer” if one of three conditions are met: “(i) the value of the 
information obtained exceeds $5,000; (ii) the offense was committed in furtherance of any felony 
… or (iii) the protected computer is owned or operated by or on behalf of a governmental 
entity.”196  Also, instead of requiring the government to prove “intent to defraud” prosecutors 
would have to establish “willfulness,” criminalizing unlawful trafficking of access to “other 
types of wrongdoing perpetrated using botnets” and not just password and similar information.197 
VI. Conclusion  
It is clear the CFAA needs to be amended.  The amount of ambiguity and discretion has 
allowed to a vast array of applications often, far beyond the original legislative intent. The 
Internet has grown a great deal since the CFAA was established and in turn requires more 
specific federal legislation. Many agree that the CFAA needs modification. However, they 
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cannot decide on if the government should have more control or less control. The CFAA needs 
to be broadened in some areas and restricted in others.  
The future of the CFAA should include serious punishments that fit the violation 
committed. Cyber-attacks are a dangerous threat to national security and should be treated as 
such. The sentences should be a grave deterrent for potential hackers. However, a user utilizing 
someone else’s Twitter account should not be as punishable as a more serious violation, like a 
cyber-attack on a government computer. The sentencing requirements must be clearly stated to 
ensure judges know what to apply during sentencing.  
Unambiguous definitions are necessary for the CFAA to become a useful statute going 
forward. Two terms that need to be dealt with are: “exceeding authorized access” and “without 
authorization.” These terms must be neatly tailored to a select group or done away with 
completely. Currently, there are a large amount of internet users that fall into this very broad 
category. Change is necessary and it needs to be done quickly.  
